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In 2009, President Barack Obama nominated Judge Sonia Sotomayor 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to the U.S. Supreme 
Court to replace the retiring Justice David Souter. It was a historic 
appointment, as she became the first Hispanic justice and the third female 
to serve on the high court.1 
 
* David L. Hudson Jr. is an assistant professor of law at Belmont University College of Law. He also 
is a co-editor of the Encyclopedia of the Fourth Amendment (2012). He is a graduate of Duke 
University (A.B.) and Vanderbilt Law School. The author would like to thank the editors of the Seattle 
University Law Review for improving this article.  
 1. Nicandro Iannacci, Sonia Sotomayor, the People’s Justice, CONST. DAILY: BLOG (May 26, 
2016), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/sonia-sotomayor-the-peoples-justice [https://perma.cc/U9 
4U-DP4A]. 
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Obama praised his first Supreme Court appointment, stating: “Over 
a distinguished career that spans three decades, Judge Sotomayor has 
worked at almost every level of our judicial system, providing her with a 
depth of experience and a breadth of perspective that will be invaluable as 
a Supreme Court justice.”2 President Obama was the third Chief Executive 
to nominate Sotomayor to a position in the federal judiciary. President 
George H. W. Bush nominated her to a federal district court position, and 
President Bill Clinton nominated her to the Second Circuit. 
Justice Sotomayor had what Linda Greenhouse, a New York Times 
Supreme Court expert, called a “stirring life story and impressive 
résumé.”3 She rose from poverty in a Bronx housing project to become a 
New York City prosecutor, a federal district court judge, and a federal 
appeals court judge.4 
Sotomayor’s influence on the Court has been profound. She is a 
consistent defender of constitutional freedoms and individual rights.5 Her 
solicitude for constitutional freedoms is shown most starkly in her Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence; Matthew T. Mangino has called her a “fierce” 
defender of the Fourth Amendment.6 Two legal commenters have 
observed that her “depth of exposure to criminal justice issues is 
unsurpassed among contemporary Supreme Court justices.”7 An astute 
student commentator observed from Sotomayor’s lower court judicial 
record that she had a “tendency to rule in favor of Fourth Amendment 
protection over governmental intrusion.”8 Another commentator stated 
that the Fourth Amendment is “more or less safe in [her] hands.”9 
 
 2. Transcript of Obama-Sotomayor Announcement, CNN (May 26, 2009), http://www.cnn.com 
/2009/POLITICS/05/26/obama.sotomayor.transcript/index.html [https://perma.cc/7NNS-URC2]. 
 3. Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Every Justice Creates a New Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/opinion/27greenhouse.html [https://perma.cc/R9DR-2EEW]. 
 4. Daniel Politi, SCOTUS Nominee Stumps GOP, SLATE (May 27, 2009), https://slate.com/news 
-and-politics/2009/05/obama-nominates-first-hispanic-to-the-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/3 
VLD-VADK]. 
 5. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Justice Sonia Sotomayor: Defending Individuals and Constitutional 
Freedoms, FREEDOM F. (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.freedomforum.org/2020/08/10/justice-sonia-
sotomayor-defending-individuals-and-constitutional-freedoms/ [https://perma.cc/YN5A-Q3D3]. 
 6. Matthew T. Mangino, Opinion, Sotomayor Fierce Defender of the Fourth Amendment, 
WAXAHACHIE DAILY LIGHT (June 1, 2018), https://www.waxahachietx.com/opinion/20180601/ 
matthew-t-mangino-sotomayor-fierce-defender-of-fourth-amendment [https://perma.cc/F3A7-798N]. 
 7. Christopher E. Smith & Ksenia Petlakh, The Roles of Sonia Sotomayor in Criminal Justice 
Cases, 45 CAP. U. L. REV. 457, 458 (2017). 
 8. William Sanders, Note, The Future of Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest, 11 AVE MARIA L. 
REV. 479, 508 (2013). 
 9. Mark Joseph Stern, Get Off My Lawn! Sonia Sotomayor’s Defense of Property and Privacy 
Under the Fourth Amendment Puts Thomas and Alito to Shame, SLATE (May 29, 2018), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/05/in-collins-v-virginia-sonia-sotomayor-mounts-a-
libertarian-defense-of-private-property.html [https://perma.cc/Q8ZY-KCVJ]. 
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This essay posits that Justice Sotomayor is the Court’s chief defender 
of the Fourth Amendment and the cherished values it protects. She has 
consistently defended Fourth Amendment freedoms—in majority, 
concurring, and especially in dissenting opinions. Part I recounts a few of 
her majority opinions in Fourth Amendment cases. Part II examines her 
concurring opinion in United States v. Jones. Part III examines several of 
her dissenting opinions in Fourth Amendment cases. 
A review of these opinions demonstrates what should be clear to any 
observer of the Supreme Court: Justice Sotomayor consistently defends 
Fourth Amendment principles and values. 
I. MAJORITY OPINIONS 
A. Collins v. Virginia 
In her majority opinion in Collins v. Virginia, Sotomayor held that a 
police officer violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting a warrantless 
search of a motorcycle parked in the driveway of the defendant’s home. 
Two police officers on separate occasions had observed an orange and 
black motorcycle breaking the speed limit, but neither officer was able to 
apprehend the driver of the motorcycle.10 
The officers compared notes and determined that both incidents 
involved the same motorcycle.11 The officers learned the motorcycle was 
likely stolen and was now in Ryan Collins’ possession. One of the officers 
discovered on Facebook that the motorcycle was parked at the top of a 
house’s driveway.12 The officer, without a warrant, went to the driveway 
of the home, where Collins’ girlfriend lived, and saw the bike covered with 
a tarp in the driveway.13 The officer walked up, pulled off the tarp, took a 
picture of the motorcycle, and then returned to his squad car.14 
The officer then saw Collins return home and knocked on the door.15 
Collins answered and, upon questioning, admitted that he bought the 
motorcycle without title.16 A grand jury indicted Collins for receiving 
stolen property.17 He filed a motion to suppress the evidence resulting from 
 
 10. Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1668 (2018). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 1668–69. 
 17. Id. at 1669. 
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the warrantless search of the bike.18 “The trial court denied the motion and 
Collins was convicted.”19 
Both the Virginia Court of Appeals and Virginia Supreme Court 
affirmed the conviction, though on different grounds. The Court of 
Appeals reasoned that the police officer had probable cause to believe that 
the motorcycle under the tarp was the same motorcycle that had eluded 
officers.20 The Virginia Supreme Court, on the other hand, reasoned that 
the warrantless search was justified by the automobile exception to the 
Fourth Amendment.21 
Collins appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed his 
conviction by an 8–1 vote. Writing for the majority, Sotomayor detailed 
the history of both the automobile exception and the heightened Fourth 
Amendment protection for the curtilage, the area right outside a home.22 
According to Sotomayor, this was “an easy case.”23 She explained 
that the automobile exception does not give “an officer the right to enter a 
home or its curtilage to access a vehicle without a warrant.”24 The 
automobile exception “is, after all, an exception for automobiles.”25 She 
explained that “searching a vehicle parked in the curtilage involves not 
only the invasion of the Fourth Amendment interest in the vehicle but also 
an invasion of the sanctity of the curtilage.”26 She concluded that “the 
automobile exception does not permit an officer without a warrant to enter 
a home or its curtilage in order to search a vehicle therein.”27 
B. City of Los Angeles v. Patel 
Sotomayor also authored the Court’s decision in City of Los Angeles 
v. Patel, a case involving a facial Fourth Amendment challenge to a city 
ordinance, which empowered police officers to obtain guest information 
from hotel operators upon demand.28 The ordinance provided that hotel 
guest records “shall be made available to any officer of the Los Angeles 
Police Department for inspection.”29 
A group of hotel operators contended that the ordinance violated the 
Fourth Amendment. A federal district court ruled that the hotel operators 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1669–70. 
 23. Id. at 1671. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1673. 
 26. Id. at 1672. 
 27. Id. at 1675. 
 28. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 412 (2015). 
 29. Id. at 413. 
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lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records.30 A divided 
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. However, the en banc 
Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the ordinance unconstitutional.31 
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor first explained that facial 
challenges are permitted under the Fourth Amendment,32 noting that the 
Court has invalidated other laws facially on Fourth Amendment grounds. 
Specifically, she highlighted precedent that invalidated a Georgia law that 
required candidates for state office to pass drug tests33 and a hospital policy 
authorizing mandatory drug tests of pregnant women.34 Sotomayor 
explained: “The Court’s precedents demonstrate not only that facial 
challenges to statutes authorizing warrantless searches can be brought, but 
also that they can succeed.”35 
She then addressed the merits of the facial challenge, determining 
that this type of administrative search requires the ability to obtain 
“precompliance review before a neutral decisionmaker.”36 She noted  
that the Los Angeles ordinance failed to provide any semblance of such  
a review: “Absent an opportunity for precompliance review, the ordinance 
creates an intolerable risk that searches authorized by it will  
exceed statutory limits, or be used as a pretext to harass hotel operators 
and their guests.”37 
The city argued that it had a strong interest in the hotel guest records 
to combat crime and that hotels are a “closely regulated” industry.38 But, 
Sotomayor explained that hotels have never been considered a closely 
regulated industry like liquor stores, firearms dealers, or automobile 
junkyards.39 She wrote: “To classify hotels as pervasively regulated would 
permit what has always been a narrow exception to swallow the rule.”40 
She cautioned that even if hotels somehow fell within the ambit of a 
closely regulated industry, the Ordinance is still unconstitutional because 
warrantless inspections are not necessary and the ordinance “fails 
sufficiently to constrain police officers’ discretion as to which hotels to 
search and under what circumstances.”41 
 
 30. Id. at 414.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 415. 
 33. Id. at 417 (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1997)). 
 34. Id. (citing Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86 (2001)). 
 35. Id. at 418. 
 36. Id. at 420. 
 37. Id. at 421. 
 38. Id. at 424. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 424–25. 
 41. Id. at 427. 
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C. Missouri v. McNeely 
Justice Sotomayor once again protected Fourth Amendment 
principles in Missouri v. McNeely, a drunk driving case in which a police 
officer obtained a blood test without first obtaining a warrant. A police 
officer stopped Tyler McNeely’s truck after observing it exceed the speed 
limit and sway across the centerline of the road.42 McNeely performed 
poorly on field sobriety tests and declined to take a breath test.43 
The officer then placed McNeely under arrest and took him to a 
nearby hospital for blood testing.44 For whatever reason, the officer 
declined to obtain a warrant.45 McNeely refused to consent to the blood 
test, but the officer directed the lab technician to perform the test, which 
resulted in a blood alcohol content of 0.154 percent.46 
Charged with driving while intoxicated, McNeely moved to suppress 
the results of the warrantless blood test as a Fourth Amendment 
violation.47 The trial court granted the motion, finding that there was no 
emergency exception to the warrant requirement in the facts of this case.48 
The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, holding that this was “a routine DWI 
case” and not an emergency.49 
Sotomayor, writing for a majority and at times a plurality of the 
Court, noted that whether there were exigent circumstances dissipating the 
need for a warrant before blood testing must be judged under the totality 
of the circumstances.50 The state of Missouri argued for a per se rule  
for warrantless blood testing in drunk driving cases, but the majority  
was unpersuaded.51 While Sotomayor recognized that the body’s natural 
metabolic processes do dissipate alcohol in the body, she noted that  
this would generally require a “significant delay” from the time of the 
arrest to the test.52 
She explained that “[i]n those drunk-driving investigations where 
police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can 
be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search,  
the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.”53 She determined  
that “[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect  
 
 42. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 145 (2013). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 145–46. 
 45. Id. at 146. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 147 (quoting State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 74 (2012)). 
 50. Id. at 149. 
 51. Id. at 151. 
 52. Id. at 152. 
 53. Id. 
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is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality  
of the circumstances.”54 
She reasoned that this rule did not undermine drunk-driving 
enforcement efforts and noted that, in many states, there are restrictions 
on nonconsensual blood testing.55 She concluded: “We hold that in drunk-
driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream 
does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify 
conducting a blood test without a warrant.”56 
II. CONCURRING OPINIONS 
A. United States v. Jones 
In this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that government 
officials violated the Fourth Amendment by attaching a global positioning 
system (GPS) device under a defendant’s vehicle. The majority opinion, 
authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, noted that the government “physically 
occupied private property” by attaching the GPS device to the car.57  
Scalia reasoned that the government trespassed upon private property with 
its actions.58 
Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, noting that “the Fourth 
Amendment is not concerned only with trespassory intrusions on 
property,” and that “physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms 
of surveillance.”59 In other words, she reasoned that Scalia’s trespass 
theory of the Fourth Amendment was too limited60 and preferred to 
consider the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test enunciated by Justice 
John Marshall Harlan II’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United States.61 
The Katz test is an often-used formulation that has been called “a great 
 
 54. Id. at 156. 
 55. Id. at 162. 
 56. Id. at 165. 
 57. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). 
 58. Id. at 406. 
 59. Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 60. Id. at 415. While she disagreed with Justice Scalia’s approach, she praised his defense of 
Fourth Amendment values in a tribute, even stating that “United States v. Jones is forefront in my 
mind when I think of Justice Scalia.” Sonia Sotomayor, A Tribute to Justice Antonin Scalia, 126 YALE 
L.J. 1609, 1610 (2017). 
 61. Jones, 565 U.S. at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
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touchstone in the law of privacy”62 that has become “synonymous” with 
the Katz decision.63 
She also questioned the viability of the third-party doctrine in Fourth 
Amendment law—the idea that persons have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy if they voluntarily provide the information to a third party.64 She 
wrote: “I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to 
some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, 
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”65 
Sotomayor also warned that the governmental surveillance employed 
in this type of case could have harmful impacts on a person’s associational 
freedoms, writing: “Awareness that the government may be watching 
chills associational and expressive freedoms.”66 Fourth Amendment 
experts lauded her for this insight.67 
III. DISSENTING OPINIONS 
A. Utah v. Strieff 
In this decision, the Supreme Court relied on the attenuation doctrine 
to avoid applying the exclusionary rule even though the police lacked 
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of an individual.68 
An anonymous call to police claimed that “narcotics activity” was 
occurring at a particular residence.69 A police officer then conducted 
intermittent surveillance of the residence and saw many visitors arrive at 
the residence and then depart after only a few minutes.70 
One notable visitor was Edward Strieff.71 The police observed Strieff 
leave the residence and go to a convenience store.72 The officer detained 
 
 62. Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 40 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 1 (2009). 
 63. Harvey A. Schneider, Katz v. United States: The Untold Story, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 13, 
21 (2009). 
 64. Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 65. Id. at 418. 
 66. Id. at 416. 
 67. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Policing Police Access to Criminal Justice Data, 104 IOWA L. 
REV. 619, 657 (2019) (“The broader societal implications of this authority are no less consequential.”); 
Kevin Emas & Tamara Pallas, United States v. Jones: Does Katz Still Have Nine Lives?, 24 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 116, 165 (2012) (“It is the larger, and more universal issues of non-trespassory 
surveillance, and particularly privacy protection of information voluntarily disclosed to third parties, 
that cause greater concern for Justice Sotomayor.”). 
 68. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060–61 (2016). 
 69. Id. at 2059. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 2060. 
 72. Id. 
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Strieff in the parking lot and had him produce identification.73  
After relaying the information to a police dispatcher, the officer learned 
that Strieff had an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation.74 
Consequently, the officer placed Strieff under arrest, searched him, and 
found illegal drugs.75 
Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority, reasoned that  
the valid arrest warrant broke the causal chain between the unlawful stop 
and the discovery of the illegal drugs.76 Thomas further reasoned that  
the arrest warrant was valid and was “entirely unconnected with the 
stop.”77 Thomas went on to write that “there is no indication that this 
unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct.”78 
He ruled that “the evidence discovered on Strieff’s person was admissible 
because the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the pre-existing 
arrest warrant.”79 
Sotomayor wrote a blistering dissent that Professor Josephine Ross 
described as “literary and searing.”80 Others called it “epic,”81 “headline-
grabbing,”82 “thundering,”83 and “scorching.”84 It began with oft-quoted 
language: “The Court today holds that the discovery of a warrant for an 
unpaid parking ticket will forgive a police officer’s violation of your 
Fourth Amendment rights.”85 She continued: “This case allows the police 
to stop you on the street, demand your identification, and check it for 
outstanding traffic warrants—even if you are doing nothing wrong.”86 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 2063. 
 77. Id. at 2062. 
 78. Id. at 2063. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Josephine Ross, Warning: Stop-and-Frisk May Be Hazardous to Your Health, 25 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 689, 691 (2016). 
 81. John Nichols, Sonia Sotomayor’s Epic Dissent Explains What’s at Stake When the Police 
Don’t Follow the Law, THE NATION (June 20, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/ 
sonia-sotomayors-epic-dissent-shows-why-we-need-people-of-color-on-the-supreme-court/ [https:// 
perma.cc/5F6L-XCHE]. 
 82. Tal Kastner, Policing Narrative, 71 SMU L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2018). 
 83. Matt Ford, Justice Sotomayor’s Ringing Dissent, THE ATLANTIC (June 20, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/utah-streiff-sotomayor/487922/ [https://perma. 
cc/F47R-DGPQ]. 
 84. Irin Carmon, Sotomayor Issues Scathing Dissent in Fourth Amendment Case, NBC NEWS 
(June 20, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/sotomayor-issues-scathing-dissent-fourth 
amendment-case-n595786 [https://perma.cc/SS7Y-GV7X]. 
 85. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. 
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She openly discussed the topic of race, something regularly missing 
from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.87 She cited such luminaries as 
W.E.B. DuBois, James Baldwin, Michelle Alexander, and Ta-Nehisi 
Coates.88 On race, Sotomayor wrote: “For generations, black and brown 
parents have given their children ‘the talk’—instructing them never to run 
down the street; always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not 
even think of talking back to a stranger—all out of fear of how an officer 
with a gun will react to them.”89 
She noted that many might forgive the police’s conduct in this case, 
as the officer’s instincts were correct that Strieff was carrying 
contraband.90 But, “a basic principle lies at the heart of the Fourth 
Amendment: Two wrongs don’t make a right.”91 
Sotomayor added that “the officer’s sole purpose was to fish for 
evidence.”92 She also emphasized that many people have outstanding 
warrants, giving the example that 16,000 of 21,000 people in Ferguson, 
Missouri, had such warrants.93 She warned that the majority’s decision 
gives license to law enforcement to treat “members of our communities as 
second-class citizens.”94 
She also warned that “many innocent people are subjected to  
the humiliations of these unconstitutional searches,” adding that “it is  
no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of this type  
of scrutiny.”95 
B. Heien v. North Carolina 
Sotomayor authored a lone dissent in Heien v. North Carolina, a case 
involving a vehicle stop wherein the police officer made a mistake of law. 
The officer stopped a vehicle after noticing that it had only one operable 
brake light, despite North Carolina law permitting the operation of 
vehicles with only one working brake light.96 The defendant, who had 
illegal drugs in the car, filed a motion to suppress and argued that the initial 
vehicle stop was unlawful.97 
 
 87. See Ross, supra note 80. 
 88. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 2065. 
 91. Id. (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)). 
 92. Id. at 2067. 
 93. Id. at 2068. 
 94. Id. at 2069. 
 95. Id. at 2070. 
 96. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57–59 (2014). 
 97. Id. 
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When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court 
determined that the officer acted reasonably even though he was  
mistaken about state law.98 Chief Justice John G. Roberts concluded, 
“[B]ecause the mistake of law was reasonable, there was reasonable 
suspicion justifying the stop.”99 
Sotomayor dissented, once again emphasizing that traffic stops  
can become frightening and humiliating.100 She wrote that “permitting 
mistakes of law to justify seizures has the perverse effect of preventing  
or delaying the clarification of the law.”101 She concluded that “an  
officer’s mistake of law, no matter how reasonable, cannot support  
the individualized suspicion necessary to justify a seizure under the  
Fourth Amendment.”102 
She also was the only justice to mention the troubling issue of race 
in the case.103 
C. Mitchell v. Wisconsin 
Recall that Sotomayor authored the Court’s majority opinion in 
Missouri v. McNeely, holding that there was no categorical exception to 
the warrant requirement for blood draws of suspected drunk drivers.104 The 
Court in Mitchell returned to this issue with a different twist—a blood 
draw from an unconscious driver.105 An officer with the Sheboygan Police 
Department received a report that Gerald Mitchell climbed into a van 
while drunk and drove away.106 The officer found Mitchell wandering 
around, out of the van, near a lake.107 The officer gave Mitchell a 
preliminary breath test, which he failed miserably with a 0.24 percent.108 
The officer who had arrested Mitchell could not conduct a more 
reliable breath test at the police station because Mitchell was too lethargic, 
so he drove Mitchell to a nearby hospital for a blood test.109 Mitchell lost 
consciousness on the way and had to be wheeled into the hospital.110 The 
 
 98. Id. at 67. 
 99. Id. at 68. 
 100. Id. at 73 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968)). 
 101. Id. at 74. 
 102. Id. at 80. 
 103. See Vivian M. Rivera, Note, When the Police Get the Law Wrong: How Heien v. North 
Carolina Further Erodes the Fourth Amendment, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 297, 314 (2016). 
 104. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 145 (2013). 
 105. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2525 (2019). 
 106. Id. at 2532. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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officer had hospital staff conduct a blood test on the unconscious Mitchell 
without the officer first obtaining a warrant.111 
Mitchell later challenged the warrantless blood test results on Fourth 
Amendment grounds.112 The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that, with 
unconscious drivers, police officers often can rely on the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.113 Writing for a 
plurality, Justice Alito explained that in cases involving unconscious 
drivers, “the need for a blood test is compelling, and an officer’s duty to 
attend to more pressing needs may leave no time to seek a warrant.”114 He 
determined that there is a compelling need for the blood test because the 
unconscious cannot perform a breath test.115 He also noted that oftentimes 
with unconscious drivers, the police may have to assist other injured 
drivers, provide first aid, or even deal with fatalities.116 The plurality, thus, 
remanded the case back to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to give the 
government an opportunity to make the case for exigent circumstances.117 
Sotomayor dissented, writing that the rule from McNeely should 
apply, and the police should obtain a warrant before drawing blood.118 To 
her, “the answer is clear: If there is time, get a warrant.”119 She reiterated 
that “there is no categorical exigency exception for blood draws.”120 
Sotomayor also explained that technological advances have made 
obtaining warrants a more expedited process.121 
She also noted the irony in the plurality emphasizing that police 
officers may have other pressing needs, such as aiding other drivers, 
because “the police encountered Mitchell alone, after he had parked and 
left his car.”122 She concluded: “The Fourth Amendment . . . requires 
police officers seeking to draw blood from a person suspected of drunk 
driving to get a warrant if possible. That rule should resolve this case.”123 
D. Kansas v. Glover 
In this decision, the Court ruled that a police officer did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment when he pulled over a vehicle assuming—but not 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 2533 
 114. Id. at 2535. 
 115. Id. at 2537. 
 116. Id. at 2538. 
 117. Id. at 2539. 
 118. Id. at 2541 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 2544. 
 121. Id. at 2548. 
 122. Id. at 2550. 
 123. Id. 
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knowing—that the driver of the vehicle was the owner of the 
automobile.124 A sheriff’s deputy in Douglas County, Kansas, observed a 
1995 pick-up truck while on routine patrol.125 He ran the license plate and 
learned the owner of the vehicle was Charles Glover Jr. who had a revoked 
driver’s license.126 The deputy assumed that Glover was the driver of the 
vehicle and pulled the vehicle over.127 The driver was indeed Glover, and 
he was charged as a habitual violator.128 
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas reasoned that the deputy 
made a “commonsense inference” that Glover likely was the operator  
of the vehicle.129 He also noted that “empirical studies” show that many 
persons with revoked driver licenses “frequently continue to drive.”130  
He explained: “The inference that the driver of a car is its registered  
owner does not require any specialized training; rather, it is a  
reasonable inference made by ordinary people on a daily basis.”131  
These commonsense judgments, according to Thomas, made the  
stop reasonable.132 
Sotomayor filed another solitary dissent, writing that the Court 
“ignores key foundations of our reasonable-suspicion jurisprudence and 
impermissibly and unnecessarily reduces the State’s burden of proof.”133 
She emphasized that the “State bears the burden of justifying a seizure.”134 
She also noted that suspicion generally “must be individualized.”135 
According to Sotomayor, the majority filled in the gaps of the 
reasonable suspicion inquiry “with its own ‘common sense,’” thus 
“allowing judges to offer their own brand of common sense where the 
State’s proffered justifications for a search come up short also shifts police 
work to the judiciary.”136 
Sotomayor concluded: “Before subjecting motorists to this  
type of investigation, the State must possess articulable facts  
and officer inferences to form suspicion.”137 She concluded that the  
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Court “destroys Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that requires 
individualized suspicion.”138 
E. Messerschmidt v. Millender 
In this decision, the Court ruled that Los Angeles County officers 
were entitled to qualified immunity for their broad search of a home for 
weapons related to a domestic dispute.139 Shelly Kelly broke off her 
relationship with Jerry Ray Bowen, who was an active member of a local 
street gang, and Kelly called the sheriff’s department to help gather her 
belongings at her and Bowen’s residence.140 Once the officers left, Bowen 
appeared at the home, yelled at Kelly, cursed her, and tried to throw her 
over the second-floor balcony.141 Bowen even fired a gun at Kelly as she 
sped away from the residence.142 Kelly reported the assault to the police.143 
Detective Curt Messerschmidt, assigned to the case, learned that 
Bowen may have been staying at the home of seventy-year-old Augusta 
Millender, Bowen’s foster mother.144 The detective also learned that 
Bowen had been arrested at least thirty-one times, many of those instances 
being firearms related.145 Based on this information, Messerschmidt drew 
up a broad search warrant for all firearms or gang-related material that 
may be at Millender’s residence.146 Law enforcement served the warrant a 
few days later at Millender’s home.147 
Law enforcement did not find Bowen at the residence but did seize 
Millender’s shotgun and a box of .45-caliber ammunition.148 The police 
found Bowen two weeks later at a motel.149 The Millenders filed a lawsuit 
against the sheriff’s department, the county of Los Angeles, and the 
individual sheriff’s deputies, including Messerschmidt.150 The key 
question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the officers were 
entitled to qualified immunity.151 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the 
officers were entitled to qualified immunity, in part because “[a] 
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reasonable officer also could believe that seizure of the firearms was 
necessary to prevent further assaults on Kelly.”152 It also was not 
unreasonable that Bowen owned multiple weapons.153 
A reasonable officer might believe that evidence showing Bowen’s 
gang affiliation “might prove helpful in impeaching Bowen or rebutting 
various defenses he could raise at trial.”154 Roberts also noted that 
Messerschmidt’s affidavit was approved by a superior officer and a deputy 
district attorney.155 Thus, according to Roberts, the warrant was not “so 
obviously defective that no reasonable officer could have believed it was 
valid.”156 Instead, the officer could have believed—based on all the  
facts—that the warrant was proper and entitled to qualified immunity.157 
Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, characterizing the warrant 
as a “general warrant.”158 She wrote that “this kind of general warrant is 
antithetical to the Fourth Amendment.”159 Further, “[t]he Fourth 
Amendment does not permit the police to search for evidence solely 
because it could be admissible for impeachment or rebuttal purposes.”160 
Sotomayor also noted that “merely possessing . . . firearms is not a crime 
at all” and characterized the majority’s analysis as “akin to a rational-basis 
test” instead of a more traditional qualified-immunity analysis.161 
She concluded that “it is not objectively reasonable for  
police investigating a specific, non-gang related assault committed  
with a particular firearm” to search for all evidence of gang activity and 
all firearms.162 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor has demonstrated—time and time  
again—her commitment to Fourth Amendment principles. More than any 
other justice on either the so-called conservative or liberal wings of the 
Court, she holds government officials’ feet to the fire in search and seizure 
cases. Her record on Fourth Amendment cases shows that she is an ardent 
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and consistent defender of individual privacy rights under the  
Fourth Amendment. 
For example, she requires the government to generally obtain a 
warrant before conducting blood tests of suspected drunk drivers.163  
She recognizes that a person’s home and curtilage are entitled to  
enhanced privacy protections.164 She requires the government to have 
individualized suspicion before conducting traffic stops.165 She 
understands that police stops can be particularly terrifying—particularly 
to those from communities that have a less-than-ideal relationship with 
law enforcement.166 
She would not grant qualified immunity when police officers write 
clearly overbroad search warrant affidavits.167 She believes that 
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy that can be infringed 
by the government’s use of technology.168 
Her Fourth Amendment record shows President Obama was 
prescient in proclaiming that her perspective would make her “an 
invaluable” member of the Supreme Court.169 
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